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Abstract. In this paper, we define discounted differential privacy, as an alternative to
(conventional) differential privacy, to investigate privacy of evolving datasets, containing
time series over an unbounded horizon. Evolving datasets arise in energy systems (e.g.,
real-time smart meter measurements), transportation (e.g., real-time traces of individual
movements), and retail industry (e.g., customer interactions and purchases from online
stores). We first define privacy loss as a measure of the amount of information leaked by
the reports at a certain fixed time and relate privacy loss to differential privacy. We observe
that privacy losses are weighted equally across time in the definition of differential privacy,
and therefore the magnitude of privacy-preserving additive noise must grow without bound
to ensure differential privacy over an infinite horizon. Motivated by the discounted utility
theory within the economics literature, we use exponential and hyperbolic discounting of
privacy losses across time to relax the definition of differential privacy under continual
observations. This implies that privacy losses in a distant past are less important than
the current ones to an individual. We use discounted differential privacy to investigate
privacy of evolving datasets using additive Laplace noise and show that the magnitude of
the additive noise can remain bounded under discounted differential privacy. We illustrate
the quality of privacy-preserving mechanisms satisfying discounted differential privacy on
smart-meter measurement time-series of real households, made publicly available by the
Ausgrid (an Australian electricity distribution company).
1. Introduction
Real-time analytics of customer data can benefit decision making of businesses in sectors,
such as energy (e.g., real-time smart-meter measurements for demand and load forecasting),
intelligent transportation (e.g., real-time traffic estimation by monitoring of movements
of individuals), and retail industry (e.g., real-time analysis of customer interactions and
purchases with online retail services to maximize profits). Privacy concerns, however, may
restrict the availability of customer data or its use in decision making. For instance, smart-
meter time-series can leak private information about household occupancy, entertainment
habits, and air conditioning decisions [1, 2, 3]. The extent of privacy concerns have proved
to sometimes even hinder the roll out of smart meters [4].
Differential privacy [5, 6] is a natural candidate to alleviate privacy concerns in general.
However, differential privacy literature most often deals with providing privacy-preserving
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responses to queries based on large, yet static datasets that are kept securely by a data
curator while, in real-time analytics, the underlying data in possession of the curator changes
over time. The composition rule of differential privacy (see, e.g., [5]) implies that the
magnitude of the additive noise that ensures differential privacy must grow rapidly, or that
the privacy budget of each response must decrease correspondingly, to ensure that the entire
privacy budget remains bounded.
Recently, better performance bounds have been derived for differentially-private re-
sponses to queries on evolving datasets [7, 8, 9]. These studies however consider certain
sets of queries, such as counting queries [7]. In these studies, the magnitude of the additive
noise still remains unbounded; the best bound is O(log(t)1.5) with t denoting the number
of observations, scaling with time. In fact, having a finite magnitude for the additive noise
might not be even possible for some queries [10].
Motivated by these observations, in this paper, we relax the definition of the differential
privacy by discounting privacy losses in distant past to be able to ensure privacy of evolv-
ing datasets over a possibly infinite1 horizon. We breakdown the definition of differential
privacy across time by the use of privacy loss. Privacy loss can be seen as a measure of the
amount of information leaked by the reports at a certain fixed time. To ensure differential
privacy, the summation of all privacy losses across time must be bounded by the privacy
budget. We show that, because in the definition of differential privacy, the privacy losses
are weighted equally across time, the magnitude of the privacy-preserving additive noise
must grow unbounded to ensure differential privacy over an infinite horizon. Therefore, the
reports become meaningless after a while. This motivates discounting privacy losses across
time to generalize, or better-said relax, the definition of differential privacy.
Discounting losses or gains across time is common place in the economics literature [11,
12]. A common practice is to exponentially discount losses or gains across time, i.e., scaling
them by δk, where δ is the discount factor and k is the delay (time to or since the observation
of the loss or gain). This discounting regime dates back to the early 20th century and is
motivated by interest/cash rates [13, 14]. More recently, it has been shown that humans
and animals follow a hyperbolic discounting regime [11, 15, 16, 17, 18]. In hyperbolic
discounting, losses or gains are scaled by 1/(1 + βk), where β is the discounting coefficient
and k is again the delay. Hyperbolic discounting has been found to relate to real-world
examples of self-control [19], which makes it more interesting within the context of privacy
preservation as it has been observed that privacy and self-control are heavily related in
personal decision making [20].
The idea that privacy loss in a distant past is less important to an individual, and is
thus discounted exponentially or hyperbolically, could be motivated by that people change
their habits and addresses across time. For instance, according to the 2007-08 Survey of
Income and Housing [21], 43% of people in Australia have moved house within the last
five years. Therefore, private information regarding their previous location can be deemed
less sensitive. Temporal discounting is conjectured to be one of the reasons behind why
few individuals take no action to protect their personal information, even when doing so
involves limited costs [22]. Note that privacy behaviour (what people do) and privacy
attitudes (what people think) should not be mistaken with each other as most individuals
1Note that, in practice, an infinite horizon does not exists. However, studying infinite horizons helps us to
understand cases in which an upper bound on the horizon is not known. For instance, in the smart-metering
example, we may not know, in advance, the duration for which a dataset of measurements is curated and
made available for real-time analytic.
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express that they are concerned about their information privacy and are willing to act to
protect it [22, 23], yet in experiments they do not [24, 25]. Discounting privacy is more
compatible with privacy behaviour in comparison to privacy attitudes. Finally, note that
the discounting factor or coefficient can be chosen based on the preferences of an individual
such that its effect is negligible over a long enough, yet finite, horizon, e.g., a person’s life
expectancy or active life span, albeit at the risk of reducing the quality of reports. This
points to bigger issue of privacy and utility trade-off.
In summary, in this paper, we make the following contributions:
• We define the notation of privacy loss as a measure of the amount of information leaked
by reports, responses to queries, at a certain time and relate privacy loss to differential
privacy;
• We use exponential and hyperbolic discounting of privacy losses across time to relax the
definition of differential privacy for use with evolving datasets;
• We use discounted differential privacy to investigate privacy of evolving datasets using an
additive Laplace noise and show that exponentially discounted differential privacy can be
achieved with bounded magnitude of additive noise in contrast with differential privacy;
• We demonstrate the applicability of this paper’s privacy-preserving mechanisms, which
meet the standards of discounted differential privacy, on smart-meter measurement time
series of private households, available from the [26].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define privacy loss and
illustrate its relationship with differential privacy. We relax the notion of differential privacy
to take into account temporal discounting of privacy losses in Section 3. We illustrate the
results of the paper on smart-meter measurements of households in Section 4. We conclude
the paper and present avenues for future research in Section 5.
2. Differential Privacy and Privacy Loss
In this section, we introduce differential privacy for evolving datasets. We breakdown the
definition of differential privacy across time to define privacy loss as a measure of the amount
of information leaked by the reports at a certain fixed time.
2.1. Differential Privacy. Consider an evolving, longitudinal dataset, containing time
series, of the form
X(t) :=


x1(1) x1(2) · · · x1(t)
x2(1) x2(2) · · · x2(t)
...
...
. . .
...
xn(1) xn(2) · · · xn(t)

 ∈ X n×t ⊆ Rn×t, (2.1)
where xi(t) ∈ X ⊆ R denotes the entry for individual i ∈ {1, . . . , n} at time instant t ∈ N.
In this paper, we assume that t is not bounded from above and can potentially approach
infinity, i.e., it can grow unbounded. Note that, for any 1 ≤ k ≤ t, X(k) denotes a matrix
extracted by eliminating the last t− k columns of X(t). An example of such a longitudinal
dataset is a dataset containing regular smart meter reading of n fixed households.
Remark 1 (Addition/Removal of Individuals). In the dataset model in (2.1), we can con-
sider addition and removal of individuals to the dataset across time. In this case, for all
time instants in which a measurement for an individual is not available because it has not
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yet arrived or has left the dataset, we can use a special characters, such as ∅. Hence, we
must have X = R ∪ {∅}.
We assume that, as the dataset evolves, the custodian reports
Y (t) =
[
y(1) y(2) · · · y(t)] ∈ Yt ⊆ Rt. (2.2)
Similarly, for any 1 ≤ k ≤ t, Y (k) denotes a row vector extracted by eliminating the last
t − k entries of Y (t). At time instance t, to generate the entry y(t), the custodian uses
conditional probability density function py|X(·|·). From now on, we refer to this as the
mechanism of the curator. The mechanisms are causal by construct, that is, at any time
instant t, the report Y (t) can only be a function of the entries of the longitudinal dataset up
to time t, X(t). In what follows, when it is evident from the context, we use p(·|·) instead of
py|X(·|·). In this paper, we are interested in the differential privacy as a notion of privacy.
Definition 2 (Neighbouring Datasets). Two datasets X(t) and X ′(t) are neighbouring
datasets, shown by X(t) ∼ X ′(t), if they differ from each other in at most one row.
Definition 3 (Differential Privacy). A reporting mechanism is ǫ-differentially private for
ǫ > 0 if for any pair of neighbouring datasets X(t),X ′(t) and any output Y (t),
p(Y (t)|X(t)) ≤ exp(ǫ)p(Y (t)|X ′(t)). (2.3)
Now, we are ready to introduce the notion of privacy loss by de-constructing the ratio
of probability density functions for use within the definition of differential privacy.
2.2. From Differential Privacy to Privacy Loss. In this subsection, we dig deeper in
the notion of differential privacy to define privacy loss. To do so, note that
p(Y (t)|X(t)) = p(y(t)|X(t), Y (t− 1))p(Y (t− 1)|X(t))
= p(y(t)|X(t))p(Y (t− 1)|X(t))
= p(y(t)|X(t))p(y(t − 1)|X(t))p(Y (t− 2)|X(t)),
where the equalities follow from the definition of conditional probability density function.
Following this line of reasoning, we get
p(Y (t)|X(t)) =
t∏
k=1
p(y(k)|X(t))
=
t∏
k=1
p(y(k)|X(k)),
where the last equality follows from the causality of the reports. This results in
p(Y (t)|X(t))
p(Y (t)|X ′(t)) =
t∏
k=1
p(y(k)|X(k))
p(y(k)|X ′(k)) .
These derivations motivate the use of p(y(k)|X(k))/p(y(k)|X ′(k)), or in fact its logarithm,
as a measure of privacy loss because if the ratio p(y(k)|X(k))/p(y(k)|X ′(k)) is large, y(k)
leaks more information in terms of increasing the required differential-privacy budget for
time instant k.
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Definition 4 (Privacy Loss). Privacy loss due to entry y(k) is
ρ(k) = sup
y(k)
sup
X(k),X′(k):X(k)∼X′(k)
log
(
p(y(k)|X(k))
p(y(k)|X ′(k))
)
.
We can relate the notion of differential privacy and privacy loss together. This is
explored in the next theorem.
Theorem 5 (Privacy Loss and Differential Privacy). A reporting mechanism is ǫ-differentially
private for ǫ > 0 if
t∑
k=1
ρ(k) ≤ ǫ. (2.4)
Proof. We have
p(Y (t)|X(t))
p(Y (t)|X ′(t)) =
t∏
k=1
p(y(k)|X(k))
p(y(k)|X ′(k)) ≤
t∏
k=1
exp(ρ(k)) = exp
(
t∑
k=1
ρ(k)
)
.
The rest of the proof follows from the definition of differential privacy.
Theorem 5 states that if the summation of all privacy losses is bounded from above by
the total privacy budget ǫ, ǫ-differential privacy can be established.
Now, consider the case where the curator is given a family of queries ft : X n×t → R,
∀t ∈ N, to compute on the evolving dataset. In return, the curator provides noisy reports
of the form:
y(t) = ft(X(t)) + w(t), (2.5)
where (w(t))t∈N is a sequence of i.i.d.
2 Laplace random variables with zero mean and scale
bt > 0.
Theorem 6. The reporting mechanism (2.5) is ǫ-differentially private for ǫ > 0 if
t∑
k=1
∆fk
bk
≤ ǫ, (2.6)
where ∆fk is the sensitivity of the query defined as
∆fk := sup
X(k),X′(k):X(k)∼X′(k)
|fk(X ′(k)) − fk(X(k))|. (2.7)
Proof. Note that
exp(ρ(k)) =
exp(−|y(k)− fk(X(k))|/bk)
exp(−|y(k)− fk(X ′(k))|/bk)
= exp
(
1
bk
|y(k)− fk(X ′(k))| − 1
bk
|y(k)− fk(X(k))|
)
= exp
(
1
bk
|fk(X ′(k))− fk(X(k))|
)
= exp
(
∆fk
bk
)
,
2i.i.d. stands for independently and identically distributed.
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where the third equality follows from that |a| − |b| ≤ |a − b| because |a| = |a − (a − b)| ≤
|a| + |a − b|. Hence, ∑tk=1 ρ(k) = ∑tk=1∆fk/bk. The rest follows from the application of
Theorem 5.
Theorem 6 implies, with a reporting mechanism in the form of (2.5), we cannot ensure
ǫ-differential privacy over an unbounded horizon unless the magnitude of the additive noise
grows unbounded or the queries become gradually less intrusive by decreasing ∆fk rapidly
enough. This is because, if bt is kept constant and ∆fk does not decrease,
∑t
k=1∆fk/bk =
+∞, which makes the satisfaction of the condition of Theorem 6 impossible.
Corollary 7. Assume that ∆fk = ∆f for all k ∈ N. The reporting mechanism (2.5) is
ǫ-differentially private for ǫ > 0 only if limk→ bk = +∞.
Proof. Assume limk→ bk = +∞ does not hold. Therefore, there exists a subsequence (kℓ)ℓ∈N
such that kℓ are increasing and bkℓ ≤ B. Therefore,
∑∞
k=1∆fk/bk ≥
∑∞
ℓ=1∆f/bkℓ ≥∑∞
ℓ=1∆f/B = ∞. Therefore, there exists a large enough t0 for which the condition of
Theorem 6 cannot be satisfied for any t ≥ t0.
Corollary 8. Assume that ∆fk = ∆f for all k ∈ N. The reporting mechanism (2.5) is
ǫ-differentially private for ǫ > 0 if
bk =
∆fπ2k2
6ǫ
, ∀k ∈ N. (2.8)
Proof. Let bk = bk
2. Hence,
∑t
k=1∆fk/bk ≤
∑∞
k=1∆fk/bk = (∆f/b)π
2/6. Therefore, we
can satisfy the condition of Theorem 6 for any t if (∆f/b)π2/6 ≤ ǫ.
These corollaries show that it is necessary for the magnitude of the privacy-preserving
additive noise to grow unbounded if we want to ensure differential privacy over an infinite
horizon. This negative result is caused by that the privacy loss at time instants k and t
are weighted equally even if k ≪ t and, at t, the information leakage at time k is no longer
relevant. This motivates discounting privacy losses across time to relax the definition of
differential privacy.
3. Discounted Differential Privacy
Humans perceive the severity (i.e., magnitude) of losses and gains differently across time.
This fact is captured in the economics literature, especially, within expected utility theory,
by discounting losses and gains that occur a long time from now.
3.1. Exponentially Discounted Differential Privacy. We start with exponentially dis-
counted privacy loss and differential privacy.
Definition 9 (Exponentially Discounted Privacy Loss). At time instant t, privacy loss due
to entry y(k) is
̺(k, t) = δt−kρ(k),
where δ ∈ (0, 1] is the discount factor.
Instead of privacy loss, we can use discounted privacy loss to ensure a certain level of
privacy. Note that, at any time instant t, we have
∑t
k=1 ̺(k, t) =
∑t
k=1 δ
t−kρ(k). Using
this, we can define exponentially discounted differential privacy.
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Definition 10 (Exponentially Discounted Differential Privacy). A reporting mechanism is
(ǫ, δ)-exponentially discounted differentially private for ǫ > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1] if
t∑
k=1
δt−kρ(k) ≤ ǫ. (3.1)
Note that (ǫ, 1)-exponentially discounted differential privacy is equivalent to ǫ-differential
privacy.
Theorem 11. The reporting mechanism (2.5) is (ǫ, δ)-exponentially discounted differen-
tially private for ǫ > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1] if
t∑
k=1
δt−k
(
∆fk
bk
)
≤ ǫ. (3.2)
Proof. The proof follows the same line of reasoning as in Theorem 6 while substituting
the definition of ǫ-differential privacy with the definition of (ǫ, δ)-exponentially discounted
differential privacy.
Corollary 12. Assume that ∆fk = ∆f for all k ∈ N. The reporting mechanism (2.5) is
(ǫ, δ)-exponentially discounted differentially private for ǫ > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1) if
bk =
∆f
ǫ(1− δ) , ∀k ∈ N. (3.3)
Proof. Let bk = b. Hence,
∑t
k=1 δ
t−k∆fk/bk = (∆f/b)
∑t−1
k=0 δ
k ≤ (∆f/b)∑∞k=0 δk =
(∆f/b)/(1 − δ). Therefore, we can satisfy the condition of Theorem 11 for any t ∈ N if
(∆f/b)/(1 − δ) ≤ ǫ.
Note that, in Corollary 12, the magnitude of the additive noise remains bounded. There-
fore, the quality of the reports do not degrade with time, which is a drawback of adopting
most notions of privacy for evolving datasets.
3.2. Hyperbolic Discounted Differential Privacy. As stated in the introduction, it
has been shown that humans and animals follow a hyperbolic discounting regime. This
motivate defining hyperbolic discounted differential privacy.
Definition 13 (Hyperbolic Discounted Privacy Loss). At time instant t, privacy loss due
to entry y(k) is
̺′(k, t) =
ρ(k)
1 + β(t− k)
where β ≥ 0 is the discounting coefficient.
In this case, we have
∑t
k=1 ̺
′(k, t) =
∑t
k=1 ρ(k)/(1 + βk). Using this, we can define
hyperbolic discounted differential privacy.
Definition 14 (hyperbolic Discounted Differential Privacy). A reporting mechanism is
(ǫ, β)-hyperbolic discounted differentially private for ǫ > 0 and β > 0 if
t∑
k=1
1
1 + β(t− k)ρ(k) ≤ ǫ. (3.4)
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Note that (ǫ, 0)-hyperbolic discounted differential privacy is equivalent to ǫ-differential
privacy.
Theorem 15. The reporting mechanism in (2.5) is (ǫ, β)-hyperbolic discounted differen-
tially private for ǫ > 0 and β ≥ 0 if
t∑
k=1
1
1 + β(t− k)
∆fk
bk
≤ ǫ. (3.5)
Proof. The proof follows the same line of reasoning as in Theorem 6 while substituting
the definition of ǫ-differential privacy with the definition of (ǫ, β)-hyperbolic discounted
differential privacy.
Corollary 16. Assume that ∆fk = ∆f . The reporting mechanism in (2.5) is (ǫ, β)-
hyperbolic discounted differentially private for ǫ > 0 and β ≥ 0 if
bk =
2∆f atanh(
√
β/(1 + β))
√
k
ǫ
√
β(β + 1)
, ∀k ∈ N. (3.6)
Proof. Let bk = b
√
k. Hence,
t∑
k=1
1
1 + β(t− k)
∆fk
bk
=
∆f
b
t∑
k=1
1
(1 + β(t− k))√k
≤∆f
b
∫ t
1
1
(1 + β(t− x))√xdx
=
2∆f
b
(
atanh
(√
βt
1 + βt
)
− atanh
(√
β
1 + βt
))
√
β(βt+ 1)
≤2∆f
b
atanh
(√
βt
1 + βt
)
√
β(βt+ 1)
.
Note that
d
dt
atanh
(√
βt
1 + βt
)
√
β(βt+ 1)
=
√
βt√
t(βt+ 1)3/2
(√
βt
1 + βt
− atanh
(√
βt
1 + βt
))
< 0,
where the inequality follows from that atanh(x) > x for all x > 0. Therefore,
atanh
(√
βt
1 + βt
)
√
β(βt+ 1)
≤ atanh(
√
β/(1 + β))√
β(β + 1)
.
The rest of the proof follows from the application of Theorem 15.
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Figure 1. Statistics of the Ausgrid data: [left] histogram of the smart-
meter measurements of the households across the year and [right] average
daily smart-meter measurements of the households.
In Corollary 16, the magnitude of the additive noise grows unbounded but at a much
slower rate than Corollary 8. Therefore, the quality of the reports, although degrading with
time, remain better than differential privacy.
4. Numerical Results
In this section, we illustrate the results of the paper on regular smart-meter measurements
from real households. We numerically investigate the quality of privacy-preserving reports
ensuring discounted differential privacy using the expected difference between noisy privacy-
preserving daily averages and true potentially privacy-intrusive average consumption of the
households.
4.1. Data. We use smart meter measurements of of households, made available by the Aus-
grid to illustrate the results of this paper [26]. The individuals in both these datasets have
been de-identified. The dataset in [26] contains electricity data for 300 homes with rooftop
solar systems that are measured by a smart meter that, in addition to measuring the usage
from the grid, records the total amount of solar power generated. The measurements are
obtained every 30 minutes over 2010-2013. In this paper, we use the data over July 2012
to June 2013. Figure 1 illustrates the statistics of the Ausgrid data. Figure 1 (a) shows the
histogram of the smart-meter measurements of the households across the year. Figure 1 (b)
illustrates the daily smart-meter measurements of the households, averaged across the indi-
viduals. This is the intended report that must to be released using the privacy-preserving
mechanism in (2.5). It can be seen that, for this example, ∆f = 200/300 in which 200 kWh
is maximum changes in consumption across a household, according to Figure 1 (a), and 300
is the number of households.
4.2. Setup. We present daily consumption of the households across the year, averaged for
the individuals. We use the reporting mechanism (2.5) to ensure the privacy of the house-
holds. We consider three setups of differential privacy, exponentially discounted differential
privacy, and hyperbolic discounted differential privacy. To this aim, we use the results of
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Figure 2. Quality of reports for the Ausgrid data under various notions
of privacy: differential privacy [left], exponentially discounted differential
privacy [middle], and hyperbolic discounted differential privacy [right].
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Figure 3. Quality of reports for the Ausgrid data versus [left] discount
factor δ and [right] discounting coefficient β.
Corollaries 8, 12, and 16 to ensure that the reports are privacy preserving in their corre-
sponding notions. We are interested in investigating the quality of the privacy-preserving
reports, i.e., the difference between the reports and the average consumption of the house-
holds. Particularly, we use the expected relative error, defined as
expected relative error (t) :=
E
{∣∣∣∣∣y(t)− 1n
n∑
i=1
xi(t)
∣∣∣∣∣
}
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
xi(t)
∣∣∣∣∣
,
as a measure of quality. We also use average expected relative error, which is defined as
avrage expected relative error =
1
T
T∑
t=1
expected relative error (t),
where T denotes the horizon of the experiment, one year in this paper.
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4.3. Results. Figure 2 shows the quality of reports in (2.5) under various notions of pri-
vacy: differential privacy [left], exponentially discounted differential privacy [middle], and
hyperbolic discounted differential privacy [right]. As expected, quality of reports for ǫ-
differential private reporting policy is bad and degrades with time, as the magnitude of the
noise needs to be increased to ensure differential privacy. It is interesting to note that, in
the hyperbolic discounted differential privacy, because the increase in the magnitude of the
privacy-preserving noise is so low that we cannot observe its disruptive effect within 1 year.
To quantify the effects of the discount factor and discounting coefficient in discounted
differential privacy, we can study the average expected relative error in Figure 3. As ex-
pected, by increasing the discounting across time, which can be achieved by decreasing
discount factor or increasing discounting coefficient, the performance improves. However,
the privacy guarantee also weakens as privacy losses from the past are dismissed faster,
which might not be desirable.
5. Conclusions and Future Work
We defined discounted differential privacy to investigate privacy in the context of evolving
datasets. We used exponential and hyperbolic discounting of privacy losses across time to
relax the definition of differential privacy under continual observations. We used discounted
differential privacy to investigate privacy of evolving datasets using an additive Laplace
noise. We illustrate the quality of privacy-preserving mechanisms satisfying discounted
differential privacy on smart-meter measurement. Future work can focus on capturing the
effect of temporal discounting on the ability of an adversary to observe private information
of an individual household.
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